Contemporary Debates in Epistemology - Paperback, by Steup Matthias Turri - Good - Taschenbuch

EAN (ISBN-13): 9780470672099
ISBN (ISBN-10): 0470672099
Gebundene Ausgabe
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsjahr: 2013
Herausgeber: Steup, Matthias, Turri, John, Sosa, Ernest, Wiley-Blackwell
400 Seiten
Gewicht: 0,608 kg
Sprache: Englisch

Buch in der Datenbank seit 2007-01-13T04:12:41+01:00 (Berlin)
Detailseite zuletzt geändert am 2023-10-24T10:19:09+02:00 (Berlin)
ISBN/EAN: 9780470672099

ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen:
0-470-67209-9, 978-0-470-67209-9
Alternative Schreibweisen und verwandte Suchbegriffe:
Autor des Buches: john matthias, türr, tur, else steup, ernes, ernest sosa, matthias willing
Titel des Buches: contemporary debates epistemology, contempo, contemporary philosophy

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Daten vom Verlag:

Autor/in: Matthias Steup; John Turri; Ernest Sosa
Titel: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy; Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
Verlag: Wiley-Blackwell; John Wiley & Sons
398 Seiten
Erscheinungsjahr: 2013-08-23
Gewicht: 0,604 kg
Sprache: Englisch
43,90 € (DE)
Not available (reason unspecified)
171mm x 243mm x 18mm

BC; Hardcover, Softcover / Philosophie; Epistemologie und Erkenntnistheorie; Epistemology; Erkenntnistheorie; Philosophie; Philosophy; Erkenntnistheorie; BB

Notes on Contributors viii Preface to the Second Edition xiii Preface to the First Edition xiv 1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1 Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1 What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10 Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17 Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22 Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 25 2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27 The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27 The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40 Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 56 3 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60 Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60 Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69 Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75 Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 79 4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84 Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath 84 Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed 95 5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107 The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108 The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 120 6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? 133 Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133 Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140 Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146 Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 149 7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152 Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152 Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 164 8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177 In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177 There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185 Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195 Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197 Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 200 9 Is There Immediate Justification? 202 There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202 There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesaña 222 Reply to Comesaña James Pryor 235 Reply to Pryor Juan Comesaña 239 10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? 244 Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244 Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255 Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267 Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 271 11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? 274 Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein 274 Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet 283 Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291 Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 295 12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298 Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298 Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 312 13 Is Justification Internal? 324 Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325 Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 337 14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351 Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig 352 Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian David 363 Index 378