ISBN: 9780199914746

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that … Mehr…

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive andeliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreduciblypersonal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentaryfirst-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in whichfirst-person perspectives contribute to reality. Books > Philosophy List_Books, [PU: Oxford University Press]<

ISBN: 9780199914746

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that… Mehr…

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal. After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality. Books, [PU: Oxford University Press]<

2013, ISBN: 0199914745

[EAN: 9780199914746], Neubuch, Oxford University Press, 2013. 272p. Paperback. Her [Baker's] book is characteristically thought provoking and provides us with a distinctive and, in many w… Mehr…

[EAN: 9780199914746], Neubuch, Oxford University Press, 2013. 272p. Paperback. Her [Baker's] book is characteristically thought provoking and provides us with a distinctive and, in many ways, attractive account of reality and our place in it. Stephen Kearns, Oxford Journals Clippings: Analysis (Publisher's information). Condition: New, [PU: Oxford University Press]<

2013, ISBN: 9780199914746

Buch, Softcover, [PU: Oxford University Press Inc], Oxford University Press Inc, 2013