1995, ISBN: 9780813506777

Gebundene Ausgabe

Kiev: golovna redaktsiya ukrains'koyi radyans'koii entsiklopdiii. Very Good with no dust jacket. 1988. Hardcover. 5885000034 . Text in Russian. A three-volume encyclopedia of Ukr… Mehr…

Kiev: golovna redaktsiya ukrains'koyi radyans'koii entsiklopdiii. Very Good with no dust jacket. 1988. Hardcover. 5885000034 . Text in Russian. A three-volume encyclopedia of Ukrainian literature.; Ex-Library; 8vo ., golovna redaktsiya ukrains'koyi radyans'koii entsiklopdiii, 1988, 3, San Diego, CA, U.S.A.: Harcourt Trade Publishers, 1995. A fine unread copy protected by Archival Brodart cover.. First Edition. Hard Cover. Fine/Fine. 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall., Harcourt Trade Publishers, 1995, 5, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Very good/Good. xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glossary of Persons. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has some wear and soiling. The aim of this book is twofold: to explain a somewhat neglected aspect of Germany's Ostpolitik of the World War I period and to contribute to a better understanding of the most critical phase of the Ukrainian national revolution--the years 1917 and 1918. This was a period during which the Ukrainian movement achieves some of its most impressive victories, yet suffered its most severe setbacks. The bulk of the book is devote to the period from the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia to the collapse of the Central Powers in November, 1918. The pre-Brest-Litovsk period and peace negotiations are treated rather extensively, inasmuch as they reflect the development of German plans for the ease in the face of the rapidly changing situation in that regions. An even greater emphasis has been placed on the period from March to November, 1918, when the Germans were in actual control of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and other eastern territories and pursued their planes with a certain degree of consistency, incomplete and contradictory though these plans were. The emphasis in this book is on the plans,m rather than on their implementation. The Ukrainian revolution, is discussed chiefly in connection with Germany's drive to the east in general, and its Ukrainian venture in particular. The years 1917 and 1 918 were critical and unhappy years in the history of the Ukraine, as well as of other states that were to be established on the ruins of the Czarist Empire. In January 1918, in fulfillment of a centuries-old desire for national and political autonomy from Russia, the Central Rada, a freely constituted body of Ukrainian leaders, proclaimed the Ukraine an independent state. In the following month. in a desperate attempt to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining control over the rich Ukrainian lands, the Rada signed a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Concluded at a moment when the European east was in chaos, this treaty opened the way for German military occupation and political domination of the Ukraine. In this meticulously researched book, Professor Oleh S. Fedyshyn provides a study of the evolution of Imperial Germany's occupation policies and German relations with the complex internal situation in the Ukraine and other eastern lands. Although he is primarily concerned with the Reich's drive into the Ukraine and with the Ukrainian independence movement, Professor Fedyshyn deals also with Austrian aims in the Ukraine, the problem of the Crimea and the Black Sea, the Polish question, and Russian-German relations of the period. Some of the most interesting aspects of this fresh examination of the Reich's eastern gamble during World War I have to do with the frictions and rivalry between the Reich's war lords and the German Foreign Office. As Professor Fedyshyn points out, events in the east, and even the destinies of the war, might have developed along entirely different lines had the Reich pursued a different or less ambivalent eastern policy, or had different officials been appointed to administer the occupation. He offers a close analysis of German maneuverings with respect to the overthrow of the Rada and the establishment of General Skoropadsky's Hetmanate as they were dictated by both ideological or expansionist projections and short-range economic and military considerations. Professor Fedyshyn bases his book principally on German and Austrian archival materials captured by the Allies during World War II, after the fall of Berlin. Scholarly and restrained, Professor Fedyhyn is none the less clear in expressing his differences with other interpretations of Germany's eastern aims during World War I. What emerges is a realistic view of one policy during this period, as well as discussion of a significant phase of the Ukrainian national movement. This earlier German involvement in the affairs of the second largest ethnic group of the Czarist Empire helps to explain the repeated German occupation of the Ukraine during World War II and the Ukrainian response to the Germans in both wars." (from the dj)., Rutgers University Press, 1971, 2.75<

1971, ISBN: 0813506778

Gebundene Ausgabe, Erstausgabe

[EAN: 9780813506777], Gebraucht, sehr guter Zustand, [PU: Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ], WORLD WAR I, GERMAN AIMS, UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT, REVOLUTION, BREST-LITOVSK, S… Mehr…

[EAN: 9780813506777], Gebraucht, sehr guter Zustand, [PU: Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ], WORLD WAR I, GERMAN AIMS, UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT, REVOLUTION, BREST-LITOVSK, SKOROPADSKY, HETMAN, CRIMEA, BLACK SEA BASIN, KHOLM, GALICIA, VON EICHHORN, GROENER, MAX HOFFMAN, RICHARD KUHLMANN, LUDENDORFF, SCHWARTZENSTEIN, RADA, Jacket, xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glossary of Persons. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has some wear and soiling. The aim of this book is twofold: to explain a somewhat neglected aspect of Germany's Ostpolitik of the World War I period and to contribute to a better understanding of the most critical phase of the Ukrainian national revolution--the years 1917 and 1918. This was a period during which the Ukrainian movement achieves some of its most impressive victories, yet suffered its most severe setbacks. The bulk of the book is devote to the period from the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia to the collapse of the Central Powers in November, 1918. The pre-Brest-Litovsk period and peace negotiations are treated rather extensively, inasmuch as they reflect the development of German plans for the ease in the face of the rapidly changing situation in that regions. An even greater emphasis has been placed on the period from March to November, 1918, when the Germans were in actual control of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and other eastern territories and pursued their planes with a certain degree of consistency, incomplete and contradictory though these plans were. The emphasis in this book is on the plans,m rather than on their implementation. The Ukrainian revolution, is discussed chiefly in connection with Germany's drive to the east in general, and its Ukrainian venture in particular. The years 1917 and 1 918 were critical and unhappy years in the history of the Ukraine, as well as of other states that were to be established on the ruins of the Czarist Empire. In January 1918, in fulfillment of a centuries-old desire for national and political autonomy from Russia, the Central Rada, a freely constituted body of Ukrainian leaders, proclaimed the Ukraine an independent state. In the following month. in a desperate attempt to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining control over the rich Ukrainian lands, the Rada signed a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Concluded at a moment when the European east was in chaos, this treaty opened the way for German military occupation and political domination of the Ukraine. In this meticulously researched book, Professor Oleh S. Fedyshyn provides a study of the evolution of Imperial Germany's occupation policies and German relations with the complex internal situation in the Ukraine and other eastern lands. Although he is primarily concerned with the Reich's drive into the Ukraine and with the Ukrainian independence movement, Professor Fedyshyn deals also with Austrian aims in the Ukraine, the problem of the Crimea and the Black Sea, the Polish question, and Russian-German relations of the period. Some of the most interesting aspects of this fresh examination of the Reich's eastern gamble during World War I have to do with the frictions and rivalry between the Reich's war lords and the German Foreign Office. As Professor Fedyshyn points out, events in the east, and even the destinies of the war, might have developed along entirely different lines had the Reich pursued a different or less ambivalent eastern policy, or had different officials been appointed to administer the occupation. He offers a close analysis of German maneuverings with respect to the overthrow of the Rada and the establishment of General Skoropadsky's Hetmanate as they were dictated by both ideological or expansionist projections and short-range economic and military considerations. Professor Fedyshyn bases his book principally on German and Austrian archival materials captured by the Allies during World War II, after the fall of Berlin. Scholarly and restrained, Professor Fedyhyn is none the less clear in expressing his differences with other interpretations of Germany's eastern aims during World War I. What emerges is a realistic view of one policy during this period, as well as discussion of a significant phase of the Ukrainian national movement. This earlier German involvement in the affairs of the second largest ethnic group of the Czarist Empire helps to explain the repeated German occupation of the Ukraine during World War II and the Ukrainian response to the Germans in both wars." (from the dj)., Books<

1971, ISBN: 9780813506777

Gebundene Ausgabe

New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Very good/Good. xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glo… Mehr…

New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Very good/Good. xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glossary of Persons. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has some wear and soiling. The aim of this book is twofold: to explain a somewhat neglected aspect of Germany's Ostpolitik of the World War I period and to contribute to a better understanding of the most critical phase of the Ukrainian national revolution--the years 1917 and 1918. This was a period during which the Ukrainian movement achieves some of its most impressive victories, yet suffered its most severe setbacks. The bulk of the book is devote to the period from the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia to the collapse of the Central Powers in November, 1918. The pre-Brest-Litovsk period and peace negotiations are treated rather extensively, inasmuch as they reflect the development of German plans for the ease in the face of the rapidly changing situation in that regions. An even greater emphasis has been placed on the period from March to November, 1918, when the Germans were in actual control of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and other eastern territories and pursued their planes with a certain degree of consistency, incomplete and contradictory though these plans were. The emphasis in this book is on the plans,m rather than on their implementation. The Ukrainian revolution, is discussed chiefly in connection with Germany's drive to the east in general, and its Ukrainian venture in particular. The years 1917 and 1 918 were critical and unhappy years in the history of the Ukraine, as well as of other states that were to be established on the ruins of the Czarist Empire. In January 1918, in fulfillment of a centuries-old desire for national and political autonomy from Russia, the Central Rada, a freely constituted body of Ukrainian leaders, proclaimed the Ukraine an independent state. In the following month. in a desperate attempt to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining control over the rich Ukrainian lands, the Rada signed a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Concluded at a moment when the European east was in chaos, this treaty opened the way for German military occupation and political domination of the Ukraine. In this meticulously researched book, Professor Oleh S. Fedyshyn provides a study of the evolution of Imperial Germany's occupation policies and German relations with the complex internal situation in the Ukraine and other eastern lands. Although he is primarily concerned with the Reich's drive into the Ukraine and with the Ukrainian independence movement, Professor Fedyshyn deals also with Austrian aims in the Ukraine, the problem of the Crimea and the Black Sea, the Polish question, and Russian-German relations of the period. Some of the most interesting aspects of this fresh examination of the Reich's eastern gamble during World War I have to do with the frictions and rivalry between the Reich's war lords and the German Foreign Office. As Professor Fedyshyn points out, events in the east, and even the destinies of the war, might have developed along entirely different lines had the Reich pursued a different or less ambivalent eastern policy, or had different officials been appointed to administer the occupation. He offers a close analysis of German maneuverings with respect to the overthrow of the Rada and the establishment of General Skoropadsky's Hetmanate as they were dictated by both ideological or expansionist projections and short-range economic and military considerations. Professor Fedyshyn bases his book principally on German and Austrian archival materials captured by the Allies during World War II, after the fall of Berlin. Scholarly and restrained, Professor Fedyhyn is none the less clear in expressing his differences with other interpretations of Germany's eastern aims during World War I. What emerges is a realistic view of one policy during this period, as well as discussion of a significant phase of the Ukrainian national movement. This earlier German involvement in the affairs of the second largest ethnic group of the Czarist Empire helps to explain the repeated German occupation of the Ukraine during World War II and the Ukrainian response to the Germans in both wars." (from the dj)., Rutgers University Press, 1971, 2.75<

1971, ISBN: 9780813506777

Gebundene Ausgabe

New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Very good/Good. xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glo… Mehr…

New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Very good/Good. xii, 401, [3] pages. Frontis map. Maps. Appendices A through G. Glossary of Persons. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has some wear and soiling. The aim of this book is twofold: to explain a somewhat neglected aspect of Germany's Ostpolitik of the World War I period and to contribute to a better understanding of the most critical phase of the Ukrainian national revolution--the years 1917 and 1918. This was a period during which the Ukrainian movement achieves some of its most impressive victories, yet suffered its most severe setbacks. The bulk of the book is devote to the period from the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia to the collapse of the Central Powers in November, 1918. The pre-Brest-Litovsk period and peace negotiations are treated rather extensively, inasmuch as they reflect the development of German plans for the ease in the face of the rapidly changing situation in that regions. An even greater emphasis has been placed on the period from March to November, 1918, when the Germans were in actual control of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and other eastern territories and pursued their planes with a certain degree of consistency, incomplete and contradictory though these plans were. The emphasis in this book is on the plans,m rather than on their implementation. The Ukrainian revolution, is discussed chiefly in connection with Germany's drive to the east in general, and its Ukrainian venture in particular. The years 1917 and 1 918 were critical and unhappy years in the history of the Ukraine, as well as of other states that were to be established on the ruins of the Czarist Empire. In January 1918, in fulfillment of a centuries-old desire for national and political autonomy from Russia, the Central Rada, a freely constituted body of Ukrainian leaders, proclaimed the Ukraine an independent state. In the following month. in a desperate attempt to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining control over the rich Ukrainian lands, the Rada signed a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Concluded at a moment when the European east was in chaos, this treaty opened the way for German military occupation and political domination of the Ukraine. In this meticulously researched book, Professor Oleh S. Fedyshyn provides a study of the evolution of Imperial Germany's occupation policies and German relations with the complex internal situation in the Ukraine and other eastern lands. Although he is primarily concerned with the Reich's drive into the Ukraine and with the Ukrainian independence movement, Professor Fedyshyn deals also with Austrian aims in the Ukraine, the problem of the Crimea and the Black Sea, the Polish question, and Russian-German relations of the period. Some of the most interesting aspects of this fresh examination of the Reich's eastern gamble during World War I have to do with the frictions and rivalry between the Reich's war lords and the German Foreign Office. As Professor Fedyshyn points out, events in the east, and even the destinies of the war, might have developed along entirely different lines had the Reich pursued a different or less ambivalent eastern policy, or had different officials been appointed to administer the occupation. He offers a close analysis of German maneuverings with respect to the overthrow of the Rada and the establishment of General Skoropadsky's Hetmanate as they were dictated by both ideological or expansionist projections and short-range economic and military considerations. Professor Fedyshyn bases his book principally on German and Austrian archival materials captured by the Allies during World War II, after the fall of Berlin. Scholarly and restrained, Professor Fedyhyn is none the less clear in expressing his differences with other interpretations of Germany's eastern aims during World War I. What emerges is a realistic view of one policy during this period, as well as discussion of a significant phase of the Ukrainian national movement. This earlier German involvement in the affairs of the second largest ethnic group of the Czarist Empire helps to explain the repeated German occupation of the Ukraine during World War II and the Ukrainian response to the Germans in both wars." (from the dj)., Rutgers University Press, 1971, 2.75<