2003, ISBN: 9780192803009

Gebundene Ausgabe

Simon & Schuster. Good. Paperback. 1995. 928 pages. Cover worn<br>With a new Introduction by the author, t he twenty-fifth anniversary edition of the Pulitzer Prize-winning epi… Mehr…

Simon & Schuster. Good. Paperback. 1995. 928 pages. Cover worn<br>With a new Introduction by the author, t he twenty-fifth anniversary edition of the Pulitzer Prize-winning epic about how the atomic bomb came to be. In rich, human, poli tical, and scientific detail, here is the complete story of the n uclear bomb. Few great discoveries have evolved so swiftly?or h ave been so misunderstood. From the theoretical discussions of nu clear energy to the bright glare of Trinity there was a span of h ardly more than twenty-five years. What began merely as an intere sting speculative problem in physics grew into the Manhattan Proj ect, and then into the Bomb with frightening rapidity, while scie ntists known only to their peers?Szilard, Teller, Oppenheimer, Bo hr, Meitner, Fermi, Lawrence, and von Neumann?stepped from their ivory towers into the limelight. Richard Rhodes takes us on tha t journey step-by-step, minute by minute, and gives us the defini tive story of manÂ's most awesome discovery and invention. The Ma king of the Atomic Bomb is at once a narrative tour de force and a document as powerful as its subject. Editorial Reviews Amazon Review If the first 270 pages of this book had been publishe d separately, they would have made up a lively, insightful, beaut ifully written history of theoretical physics and the men and wom en who plumbed the mysteries of the atom. Along with the followin g 600 pages, they become a sweeping epic, filled with terror and pity, of the ultimate scientific quest: the development of the ul timate weapon. Rhodes is a peerless explainer of difficult concep ts; he is even better at chronicling the personalities who made t he discoveries that led to the Bomb. Niels Bohr dominates the fir st half of the book as J. Robert Oppenheimer does the second; bot h men were gifted philosophers of science as well as brilliant ph ysicists. The central irony of this book, which won a National Bo ok Critics Circle Award, is that the greatest minds of the centur y contributed to the greatest destructive force in history. Abou t the Author Richard Rhodes is a widely published author. His art icles have appeared in numerous national magazines. He graduated from Yale University and has received fellowships from the Ford F oundation, the National Endowment for the Arts, the John Simon Gu ggenheim Memorial Foundation, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Excerpt. ® Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. Chapt er 1 Moonshine In London, where Southampton Row passes Russell Square, across from the British Museum in Bloomsbury, Leo Szilard waited irritably one gray Depression morning for the stoplight t o change. A trace of rain had fallen during the night; Tuesday, S eptember 12, 1933, dawned cool, humid and dull. Drizzling rain wo uld begin again in early afternoon. When Szilard told the story l ater he never mentioned his destination that morning. He may have had none; he often walked to think. In any case another destinat ion intervened. The stoplight changed to green. Szilard stepped o ff the curb. As he crossed the street time cracked open before hi m and he saw a way to the future, death into the world and all ou r woe, the shape of things to come. Leo Szilard, the Hungarian theoretical physicist, born of Jewish heritage in Budapest on Feb ruary 11, 1898, was thirty-five years old in 1933. At five feet, six inches he was not tall even for the day. Nor was he yet the s hort fat man, round-faced and potbellied, his eyes shining with i ntelligence and wit and as generous with his ideas as a Maori chi ef with his wives, that the French biologist Jacques Monod met in a later year. Midway between trim youth and portly middle age, S zilard had thick, curly, dark hair and an animated face with full lips, flat cheekbones and dark brown eyes. In photographs he sti ll chose to look soulful. He had reason. His deepest ambition, mo re profound even than his commitment to science, was somehow to s ave the world. The Shape of Things to Come was H. G. Wells' new novel, just published, reviewed with avuncular warmth in The Tim es on September 1. Mr. Wells' newest 'dream of the future' is its own brilliant justification, The Times praised, obscurely. The v isionary English novelist was one among Szilard's network of infl uential acquaintances, a network he assembled by plating his arti culate intelligence with the purest brass. In 1928, in Berlin, where he was a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin and a con fidant and partner in practical invention of Albert Einstein, Szi lard had read Wells' tract The Open Conspiracy. The Open Conspira cy was to be a public collusion of science-minded industrialists and financiers to establish a world republic. Thus to save the wo rld. Szilard appropriated Wells' term and used it off and on for the rest of his life. More to the point, he traveled to London in 1929 to meet Wells and bid for the Central European rights to hi s books. Given Szilard's ambition he would certainly have discuss ed much more than publishing rights. But the meeting prompted no immediate further connection. He had not yet encountered the most appealing orphan among Wells' Dickensian crowd of tales. Szila rd's past prepared him for his revelation on Southampton Row. He was the son of a civil engineer. His mother was loving and he was well provided for. I knew languages because we had governesses a t home, first in order to learn German and second in order to lea rn French. He was sort of a mascot to classmates at his Gymnasium , the University of Budapest's famous Minta. When I was young, he told an audience once, I had two great interests in life; one wa s physics and the other politics. He remembers informing his awed classmates, at the beginning of the Great War, when he was sixte en, how the fortunes of nations should go, based on his precociou s weighing of the belligerents' relative political strength: I said to them at the time that I did of course not know who would win the war, but I did know how the war ought to end. It ought to end by the defeat of the central powers, that is the Austro-Hung arian monarchy and Germany, and also end by the defeat of Russia. I said I couldn't quite see how this could happen, since they we re fighting on opposite sides, but I said that this was really wh at ought to happen. In retrospect I find it difficult to understa nd how at the age of sixteen and without any direct knowledge of countries other than Hungary, I was able to make this statement. He seems to have assembled his essential identity by sixteen. H e believed his clarity of judgment peaked then, never to increase further; it perhaps even declined. His sixteenth year was the first year of a war that would shatter the political and legal ag reements of an age. That coincidence -- or catalyst -- by itself could turn a young man messianic. To the end of his life he made dull men uncomfortable and vain men mad. He graduated from the Minta in 1916, taking the Eötvös Prize, the Hungarian national pr ize in mathematics, and considered his further education. He was interested in physics but there was no career in physics in Hunga ry. If he studied physics he could become at best a high school t eacher. He thought of studying chemistry, which might be useful l ater when he picked up physics, but that wasn't likely either to be a living. He settled on electrical engineering. Economic justi fications may not tell all. A friend of his studying in Berlin no ticed as late as 1922 that Szilard, despite his Eötvös Prize, fel t that his skill in mathematical operations could not compete wit h that of his colleagues. On the other hand, he was not alone amo ng Hungarians of future prominence in physics in avoiding the bac kwater science taught in Hungarian universities at the time. He began engineering studies in Budapest at the King Joseph Institu te of Technology, then was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army . Because he had a Gymnasium education he was sent directly to of ficers' school to train for the cavalry. A leave of absence almos t certainly saved his life. He asked for leave ostensibly to give his parents moral support while his brother had a serious operat ion. In fact, he was ill. He thought he had pneumonia. He wanted to be treated in Budapest, near his parents, rather than in a fro ntier Army hospital. He waited standing at attention for his comm anding officer to appear to hear his request while his fever burn ed at 102 degrees. The captain was reluctant; Szilard characteris tically insisted on his leave and got it, found friends to suppor t him to the train, arrived in Vienna with a lower temperature bu t a bad cough and reached Budapest and a decent hospital. His ill ness was diagnosed as Spanish influenza, one of the first cases o n the Austro-Hungarian side. The war was winding down. Using fami ly connections he arranged some weeks later to be mustered out. N ot long afterward, I heard that my own regiment, sent to the fron t, had been under severe attack and that all of my comrades had d isappeared. In the summer of 1919, when Lenin's Hungarian proté gé Bela Kun and his Communist and Social Democratic followers est ablished a short-lived Soviet republic in Hungary in the disorder ed aftermath of Austro-Hungarian defeat, Szilard decided it was t ime to study abroad. He was twenty-one years old. Just as he arra nged for a passport, at the beginning of August, the Kun regime c ollapsed; he managed another passport from the right-wing regime of Admiral Nicholas Horthy that succeeded it and left Hungary aro und Christmastime. Still reluctantly committed to engineering, Szilard enrolled in the Technische Hochschule, the technology ins titute, in Berlin. But what had seemed necessary in Hungary seeme d merely practical in Germany. The physics faculty of the Univers ity of Berlin included Nobel laureates Albert Einstein, Max Planc k and Max von Laue, theoreticians of the first rank. Fritz Haber, whose method for fixing nitrogen from the air to make nitrates f or gunpowder saved Germany from early defeat in the Great War, wa s only one among many chemists and physicists of distinction at t he several government- and industry-sponsored Kaiser Wilhelm Inst itutes in the elegant Berlin suburb of Dahlem. The difference in scientific opportunity between Budapest and Berlin left Szilard p hysically unable to listen to engineering lectures. In the end, a s always, the subconscious proved stronger than the conscious and made it impossible for me to make any progress in my studies of engineering. Finally the ego gave in, and I left the Technische H ochschule to complete my studies at the University, some time aro und the middle of '21. Physics students at that time wandered E urope in search of exceptional masters much as their forebears in scholarship and craft had done since medieval days. Universities in Germany were institutions of the state; a professor was a sal aried civil servant who also collected fees directly from his stu dents for the courses he chose to give (a Privatdozent, by contra st, was a visiting scholar with teaching privileges who received no salary but might collect fees). If someone whose specialty you wished to learn taught at Munich, you went to Munich; if at Gött ingen, you went to Göttingen. Science grew out of the craft tradi tion in any case; in the first third of the twentieth century it retained -- and to some extent still retains -- an informal syste m of mastery and apprenticeship over which was laid the more rece nt system of the European graduate school. This informal collegia lity partly explains the feeling among scientists of Szilard's ge neration of membership in an exclusive group, almost a guild, of international scope and values. Szilard's good friend and fello w Hungarian, the theoretical physicist Eugene Wigner, who was stu dying chemical engineering at the Technische Hochschule at the ti me of Szilard's conversion, watched him take the University of Be rlin by storm. As soon as it became clear to Szilard that physics was his real interest, he introduced himself, with characteristi c directness, to Albert Einstein. Einstein was a man who lived ap art -- preferring originality to repetition, he taught few course s -- but Wigner remembers that Szilard convinced him to give them a seminar on statistical mechanics. Max Planck was a gaunt, bald elder statesman whose study of radiation emitted by a uniformly heated surface (such as the interior of a kiln) had led him to di scover a universal constant of nature. He followed the canny trad ition among leading scientists of accepting only the most promisi ng students for tutelage; Szilard won his attention. Max von Laue , the handsome director of the university's Institute for Theoret ical Physics, who founded the science of X-ray crystallography an d created a popular sensation by thus making the atomic lattices of crystals visible for the first time, accepted Szilard into his brilliant course in relativity theory and eventually sponsored h is Ph.D. dissertation. The postwar German infection of despair, cynicism and rage at defeat ran a course close to febrile halluc ination in Berlin. The university, centrally located between Doro theenstrasse and Unter den Linden due east of the Brandenburg Gat e, was well positioned to observe the bizarre effects. Szilard mi ssed the November 1918 revolution that began among mutinous sailo rs at Kiel, quickly spread to Berlin and led to the retreat of th e Kaiser to Holland, to armistice and eventually to the founding, after bloody riots, of the insecure Weimar Republic. By the time he arrived in Berlin at the end of 1919 more than eight months o f martial law had been lifted, leaving a city at first starving a nd bleak but soon restored to intoxicating life. There was snow on the ground, an Englishman recalls of his first look at postwa r Berlin in the middle of the night, and the blend of snow, neon and huge hulking buildings was unearthly. You felt you had arrive d somewhere totally strange. To a German involved in the Berlin t heater of the 1920s the air was always bright, as if it were pepp ered, like New York late in autumn: you needed little sleep and n ever seemed tired. Nowhere else did you fail in such good form, n owhere else could you be knocked on the chin time and again witho ut being counted out. The German aristocracy retreated from view, and intellectuals, film stars and journalists took its place; th e major annual social event in the city where an imperial palace stood empty was the Press Ball, sponsored by the Berlin Press, Simon & Schuster, 1995, 2.5, Anchor. Very Good. 5.19 x 0.7 x 7.96 inches. Paperback. 2003. 320 pages. <br>The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between p oliticians and military leaders in wartime democracies contends t hat politicians should declare a military operation's objectives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the military . In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-milita ry relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dare d to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to grea t effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Cleme nceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argum ent, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, Wa r is too important to leave to the generals. By examining the sha red leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extrao rdinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active sta tesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subo rdinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supre me Command is essential reading not only for military and politic al players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested i n leadership. Editorial Reviews Review An excellent, vividly wr itten argument [that] could not have come at a better time. -The Washington Post Brilliant. . . . Cohen argues convincingly that all great wartime leaders-Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, Ben Gur ion-never left the military to make its own policy, but constantl y prodded, challenged, and gave it direction. -National Review A brilliant account of Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau and Ben Guri on-how each man handled the military leaders who served him.-The Wall Street Journal Fascinating....Mr. Cohen's point is ultimate ly not a sentimental but a substantive one....His elucidation of his theory is organized tightly and rendered crisply.- The New Yo rk Times Superb . . . Cohen is persuasive in his argument. -Los Angeles Times Book Review Every so often a book appears just at the moment when it is most needed. . . . Such a book is Supreme C ommand, a superb study of civilian commanders in chief in times o f war by the nation's leading scholar of military-civilian relati ons.-The Weekly Standard Cohen's well-written, absorbing critiqu e of the normal theory is nothing short of crushing. . . . Invalu able.-The New Leader It is well worth devoting some energy to st amping on the myth that soldiers should be allowed to go about th eir business without pesky politicians getting in the way, and an important contribution to this demolition job has been made by E liot Cohen.-The Economist Supreme Command is Cohen's tour de for ce. . . . An eloquent, eminently approachable argument. . . . Ess ential reading.-Choice Supreme Command will be read as often by the professional military and the civil servants and politicians that employ them as is Samuel Huntington's The Soldiers and the S tate and Morris Janowitz's The Professional Soldier, both of whic h are true classics.-The Washington Times Intrinsically signific ant to the study of strategy and important on a practical level.- Booklist Important. . . . Many senior politicians now balk at as king tough questions or challenging military judgments even as th ey set ambitious goals. But Cohen's logic remains sound, and it w ould be a shame if it took a calamity, resulting from a combinati on of military misjudgment and civilian passivity, before it gets a hearing.-Foreign Affairs Cohen, who writes with concision and insight, robustly argues that, far from being incompetent dunder heads, as commonly portrayed, civilian statesmen can be brilliant commanders. . . . Give[s] us much to ponder.-Washington Monthly Supreme Command is a must read for the highest civilian and mil itary leadership and should also rank high on military profession al reading lists.-Naval War College Review Essential reading for anyone concerned with current United States civil-military relat ions and national strategy. . . . It is cogent in nearly every de tail-and we need all the help it can offer.-The Journal of Milita ry History Cohen's revisionist thesis is especially timely. . . . [He] is surely right that we need to develop different - more t raditional - attitudes and protocols concerning the military-civi lian partnership. -Commentary No one is better qualified than Co hen to write about political leadership in wartime. . . . This su stained analysis by a perceptive 'subordinate' who is also an out standing historian should become required reading for statesmen a nd students alike.-The National Interest From the Inside Flap Th e orthodoxy regarding the relationship between politicians and mi litary leaders in wartime democracies contends that politicians s hould declare a military operation's objectives and then step asi de and leave the business of war to the military. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in w artime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honore d belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provok e, and even defy their military officers to great effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Ch urchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, ?War is too importa nt to leave to the generals.? By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varie d military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to suc ceed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. T hought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is e ssential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership. From the Back Cover The orthodoxy regarding the relationship betw een politicians and military leaders in wartime democracies conte nds that politicians should declare a military operation's object ives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the mil itary. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-m ilitary relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips aw ay at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put i t, War is too important to leave to the generals. By examining th e shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in e xtraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that activ e statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and po litical players but also for informed citizens and anyone interes ted in leadership. About the Author Eliot A. Cohen is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inte rnational Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. He previously served on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretar y of Defense and as an intelligence officer in the United States Army Reserve, and taught at the U.S. Naval War College and at Har vard University. He has written books and articles on a variety o f military and national security-related subjects. A frequent con sultant to the Department of Defense and the intelligence communi ty, he is a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the Secr etary of Defense. He lives in Washington, D.C. Excerpt. ® Reprin ted by permission. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 The Soldier an d the Statesman Few choices bedevil organizations as much as the selection of senior leaders. Often they look for those with high -level experience in different settings: New York City's Columbia University sought out America's most senior general, Dwight D. E isenhower, to lead it after World War II; President Ronald Reagan made a corporate tycoon his chief of staff in 1985; in the early 1990s, Sears Roebuck, an ailing giant, looked to the chief logis tician of the Gulf War to help it turn around. Frequently enough the transplant fails; the sets of skills and aptitudes that led t o success in one walk of life either do not carry over or are dow nright dysfunctional in another. The rules of politics differ fro m those of business, and universities do not act the way corporat ions do. Even within the business world, car companies and softwa re giants may operate very differently, and the small arms manufa cturer who takes over an ice-cream company may never quite settle in to the new culture. To be sure, leaders at the top have some roughly similar tasks: setting directions, picking subordinates, monitoring performance, handling external constituencies, and in spiring achievement. And they tend, often enough, to think that s omeone in a different walk of life has the answers to their dilem mas, which is why the generals study business books, and the CEOs peruse military history. But in truth the details of their work differ so much that in practice the parallels often elude them, o r can only be discovered by digging more deeply than is the norm. The relations between statesmen and soldiers in wartime offer a special case of this phenomenon. Many senior leaders in private life must manage equally senior professionals who have expertise and experience that dwarf their own, but politicians dealing with generals in wartime face exceptional difficulties. The stakes ar e so high, the gaps in mutual understanding so large, the differe nces in personality and background so stark, that the challenges exceed anything found in the civilian sector-which is why, perhap s, these relationships merit close attention not only from histor ians and students of policy, but from anyone interested in leader ship at its most acutely difficult. To learn how statesmen manage their generals in wartime one must explore the peculiarities of the military profession and the exceptional atmospheres and value s produced by war. These peculiarities and conditions are unique and extreme, and they produce relationships far more complicated and tense than either citizen or soldier may expect in peacetime, or even admit to exist in time of war. Let him come with me int o Macedonia To see why, turn back to the year 168 b.c. The place is the Senate of the Roman republic, the subject the proposed re sumption of war (for the third time) against Macedonia, and the s peaker Consul Lucius Aemilius: I am not, fellow-citizens, one wh o believes that no advice may be given to leaders; nay rather I j udge him to be not a sage, but haughty, who conducts everything a ccording to his own opinion alone. What therefore is my conclusio n? Generals should receive advice, in the first place from the ex perts who are both specially skilled in military matters and have learned from experience; secondly, from those who are on the sce ne of action, who see the terrain, the enemy, the fitness of the occasion, who are sharers in the danger, as it were, aboard the s ame vessel. Thus, if there is anyone who is confident that he can advise me as to the best advantage of the state in this campaign which I am about to conduct, let him not refuse his services to the state, but come with me into Macedonia. I will furnish him wi th his sea-passage, with a horse, a tent, and even travel-funds. If anyone is reluctant to do this and prefers the leisure of the city to the hardships of campaigning, let him not steer the ship from on shore. The city itself provides enough subjects for conve rsation; let him confine his garrulity to these; and let him be a ware that I shall be satisfied with the advice originating in cam p.1 The Consul's cry for a free hand echoes that of generals thr oughout history-although the historian Livy records that, as a ma tter of fact, an unusually large number of senators decided to ac company him on campaign. Still, the notion that generals once giv en a mission should have near total discretion in its execution i s a powerful one. Popular interpretations of the Vietnam and Gul f wars, the one supposedly a conflict characterized by civilian i nterference in the details of warmaking, the other a model of ben ign operational and tactical neglect by an enlightened civilian l eadership, seem to confirm the value of a bright line drawn betwe en the duties of soldiers and civilians. Thus the chief of staff to General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of US forces in Southwes t Asia: Schwarzkopf was never second-guessed by civilians, and th at's the way it ought to work.2 Or more directly, then-President George Bush's declaration when he received the Association of the US Army's George Catlett Marshall Medal: I vowed that I would ne ver send an American soldier into combat with one hand tied behin d that soldier's back. We did the politics and you superbly did t he fighting.3 Small wonder, then, that the editor of the US Army War College's journal wrote to his military colleagues: There wi ll be instances where civilian officials with Napoleon complexes and micromanaging mentalities are prompted to seize the reins of operational control. And having taken control, there will be time s when they then begin to fumble toward disaster. When this threa tens to happen, the nation's top soldier . . . must summon the co urage to rise and say to his civilian masters, You can't do that! and then stride to the focal point of decision and tell them how it must be done.4 Such a view of the roles of civilian and sold ier reflects popular understandings as well. The 1996 movie Indep endence Day, for example, features only one notable villain (asid e, that is, from the aliens who are attempting to devastate and c onquer the Earth)-an overweening secretary of defense who attempt s to direct the American military's counterattack against the inv aders from outer space. Only after the interfering and deceitful civilian is out of the way can the president, a former Air Force combat pilot who gets back into uniform to lead the climactic aer ial battle, and his military assistants (with the aid of one civi lian scientist in a purely technical role) get on with the job of defeating the foe. To this comfortable consensus of capital, cam p, and, Anchor, 2003, 3, Oxford University Press. Good. 6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches. Hardcover. 2003. 256 pages. Ex-library<br>The Fall of France in 1940 is one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth century. If the German invasion of France had failed, it is arguable that the war might have end ed right there. But the French suffered instead a dramatic and hu miliating defeat, a loss that ultimately drew the whole world int o war. This exciting new book by Julian Jackson, a leading histo rian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greate st bastions of the Western Allies. Using eyewitness accounts, mem oirs, and diaries to bring the story to life, Jackson not only re creates the intense atmosphere of the six weeks in May and June l eading up to the establishment of the Vichy regime, but he also u nravels the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question--was the fall of France inevitable. Jackson's vivid narrative explores the errors of France's military leaders, her inability to create stronger alliances, the political infigh ting, the lack of morale, even the decadence of the inter-war yea rs. He debunks the vast superiority of the German army, revealing that the more experienced French troops did well in battle again st the Germans. Perhaps more than anything else, the cause of the defeat was the failure of the French to pinpoint where the main thrust of the German army would come, a failure that led them to put their best soldiers up against a feint, while their worst tro ops faced the heart of the German war machine. An engaging and au thoritative narrative, The Fall of France illuminates six weeks t hat changed the course of twentieth-century history. Editorial R eviews From Publishers Weekly In his thorough monograph, Univers ity of Swansea historian Jackson (The Dark Years) begins with pre -war developments-French military innovations and battle strategy ; Germany's plan to invade Belgium and France-before recounting t he German breakthrough and defeat of British and French forces in May 1940. The second chapter opens with General Weygand taking c ommand of the French army later that month, then provides backgro und on France's position in Europe before the war, particularly i ts relations with Great Britain: the failure of attempted British -French-Soviet alliance in early 1939, and the so-called Phony Wa r on the western front September 1939-April 1940. He tracks Frenc h attempts to halt the German onslaught and the evacuation of All ied troops from Dunkirk, leading to the June 1940 surrender, then cuts back to analyze French internal politics during the 1930s a nd its effect on French foreign policy. Another chapter gets devo ted to the French people circa 1940, including pacifist society f ollowing World War I; soldiers' reactions to the German invasion and recollections of the mass exodus of WWI refugees from the adv ancing Germans are also covered. The final chapters provide a his toriography of the campaign itself and the effects of the defeat on France, focusing on the collaborationist Vichy government that followed the defeat, the rise of De Gaulle's movement, and a tre atment of how the defeat is viewed today. Designed for the academ ic rather than the casual reader, this presentation is careful an d measured, and seems likely to find its way onto college history syllabi. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc. Review Superb, highly accessible revisionist study of Germany's swift defeat of France in 1940 and its wide-ranging implications, then and now.... Should spark discussion among WWII historians and gre at interest among military history buffs.--Kirkus Reviews France 's sudden and shocking defeat in May of 1940 was one of the great calamities in the history of Western democracy.... Jackson asses ses the social and political, and also the diplomatic, intelligen ce, and military, context of the catastrophe.... An admirably acc essible analytical history of a complex and fraught event.--Atlan tic Monthly Jackson's book tells in gripping detail the military , human and political story of a few crucial weeks whose ramifica tions for European relations for decades afterwards were enormous .... More than a military history, this sharply written account i s also an elegy for a fading culture in which we all have a stake .--Financial Times A brilliant and authoritative book, compellin gly written and persuasive in its explanation of one of the most puzzling events in 20th-century history. Impossible to put down.' Richard Evans, Cambridge University'A fine, powerful and very re adable book. Jackson brings a freshness and sharpness to the disc ussion, with the reader being drawn straight into the action and atmosphere.--Robert Gildea, Oxford University About the Author Julian Jackson is Professor of French History at the University o f Swansea and the author of several books on twentieth-century Fr ance, including France: The Dark Years 1940-1944, which was a fin alist for a Los Angeles Times Book Award. ., Oxford University Press, 2003, 2.5<

2003, ISBN: 9780192803009

Gebundene Ausgabe

Anchor. Very Good. 5.19 x 0.7 x 7.96 inches. Paperback. 2003. 320 pages. <br>The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between p oliticians and military leaders in wartime democracie… Mehr…

Anchor. Very Good. 5.19 x 0.7 x 7.96 inches. Paperback. 2003. 320 pages. <br>The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between p oliticians and military leaders in wartime democracies contends t hat politicians should declare a military operation's objectives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the military . In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-milita ry relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dare d to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to grea t effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Cleme nceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argum ent, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, Wa r is too important to leave to the generals. By examining the sha red leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extrao rdinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active sta tesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subo rdinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supre me Command is essential reading not only for military and politic al players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested i n leadership. Editorial Reviews Review An excellent, vividly wr itten argument [that] could not have come at a better time. -The Washington Post Brilliant. . . . Cohen argues convincingly that all great wartime leaders-Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, Ben Gur ion-never left the military to make its own policy, but constantl y prodded, challenged, and gave it direction. -National Review A brilliant account of Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau and Ben Guri on-how each man handled the military leaders who served him.-The Wall Street Journal Fascinating....Mr. Cohen's point is ultimate ly not a sentimental but a substantive one....His elucidation of his theory is organized tightly and rendered crisply.- The New Yo rk Times Superb . . . Cohen is persuasive in his argument. -Los Angeles Times Book Review Every so often a book appears just at the moment when it is most needed. . . . Such a book is Supreme C ommand, a superb study of civilian commanders in chief in times o f war by the nation's leading scholar of military-civilian relati ons.-The Weekly Standard Cohen's well-written, absorbing critiqu e of the normal theory is nothing short of crushing. . . . Invalu able.-The New Leader It is well worth devoting some energy to st amping on the myth that soldiers should be allowed to go about th eir business without pesky politicians getting in the way, and an important contribution to this demolition job has been made by E liot Cohen.-The Economist Supreme Command is Cohen's tour de for ce. . . . An eloquent, eminently approachable argument. . . . Ess ential reading.-Choice Supreme Command will be read as often by the professional military and the civil servants and politicians that employ them as is Samuel Huntington's The Soldiers and the S tate and Morris Janowitz's The Professional Soldier, both of whic h are true classics.-The Washington Times Intrinsically signific ant to the study of strategy and important on a practical level.- Booklist Important. . . . Many senior politicians now balk at as king tough questions or challenging military judgments even as th ey set ambitious goals. But Cohen's logic remains sound, and it w ould be a shame if it took a calamity, resulting from a combinati on of military misjudgment and civilian passivity, before it gets a hearing.-Foreign Affairs Cohen, who writes with concision and insight, robustly argues that, far from being incompetent dunder heads, as commonly portrayed, civilian statesmen can be brilliant commanders. . . . Give[s] us much to ponder.-Washington Monthly Supreme Command is a must read for the highest civilian and mil itary leadership and should also rank high on military profession al reading lists.-Naval War College Review Essential reading for anyone concerned with current United States civil-military relat ions and national strategy. . . . It is cogent in nearly every de tail-and we need all the help it can offer.-The Journal of Milita ry History Cohen's revisionist thesis is especially timely. . . . [He] is surely right that we need to develop different - more t raditional - attitudes and protocols concerning the military-civi lian partnership. -Commentary No one is better qualified than Co hen to write about political leadership in wartime. . . . This su stained analysis by a perceptive 'subordinate' who is also an out standing historian should become required reading for statesmen a nd students alike.-The National Interest From the Inside Flap Th e orthodoxy regarding the relationship between politicians and mi litary leaders in wartime democracies contends that politicians s hould declare a military operation's objectives and then step asi de and leave the business of war to the military. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in w artime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honore d belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provok e, and even defy their military officers to great effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Ch urchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, ?War is too importa nt to leave to the generals.? By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varie d military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to suc ceed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. T hought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is e ssential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership. From the Back Cover The orthodoxy regarding the relationship betw een politicians and military leaders in wartime democracies conte nds that politicians should declare a military operation's object ives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the mil itary. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-m ilitary relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips aw ay at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put i t, War is too important to leave to the generals. By examining th e shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in e xtraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that activ e statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and po litical players but also for informed citizens and anyone interes ted in leadership. About the Author Eliot A. Cohen is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inte rnational Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. He previously served on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretar y of Defense and as an intelligence officer in the United States Army Reserve, and taught at the U.S. Naval War College and at Har vard University. He has written books and articles on a variety o f military and national security-related subjects. A frequent con sultant to the Department of Defense and the intelligence communi ty, he is a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the Secr etary of Defense. He lives in Washington, D.C. Excerpt. ® Reprin ted by permission. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 The Soldier an d the Statesman Few choices bedevil organizations as much as the selection of senior leaders. Often they look for those with high -level experience in different settings: New York City's Columbia University sought out America's most senior general, Dwight D. E isenhower, to lead it after World War II; President Ronald Reagan made a corporate tycoon his chief of staff in 1985; in the early 1990s, Sears Roebuck, an ailing giant, looked to the chief logis tician of the Gulf War to help it turn around. Frequently enough the transplant fails; the sets of skills and aptitudes that led t o success in one walk of life either do not carry over or are dow nright dysfunctional in another. The rules of politics differ fro m those of business, and universities do not act the way corporat ions do. Even within the business world, car companies and softwa re giants may operate very differently, and the small arms manufa cturer who takes over an ice-cream company may never quite settle in to the new culture. To be sure, leaders at the top have some roughly similar tasks: setting directions, picking subordinates, monitoring performance, handling external constituencies, and in spiring achievement. And they tend, often enough, to think that s omeone in a different walk of life has the answers to their dilem mas, which is why the generals study business books, and the CEOs peruse military history. But in truth the details of their work differ so much that in practice the parallels often elude them, o r can only be discovered by digging more deeply than is the norm. The relations between statesmen and soldiers in wartime offer a special case of this phenomenon. Many senior leaders in private life must manage equally senior professionals who have expertise and experience that dwarf their own, but politicians dealing with generals in wartime face exceptional difficulties. The stakes ar e so high, the gaps in mutual understanding so large, the differe nces in personality and background so stark, that the challenges exceed anything found in the civilian sector-which is why, perhap s, these relationships merit close attention not only from histor ians and students of policy, but from anyone interested in leader ship at its most acutely difficult. To learn how statesmen manage their generals in wartime one must explore the peculiarities of the military profession and the exceptional atmospheres and value s produced by war. These peculiarities and conditions are unique and extreme, and they produce relationships far more complicated and tense than either citizen or soldier may expect in peacetime, or even admit to exist in time of war. Let him come with me int o Macedonia To see why, turn back to the year 168 b.c. The place is the Senate of the Roman republic, the subject the proposed re sumption of war (for the third time) against Macedonia, and the s peaker Consul Lucius Aemilius: I am not, fellow-citizens, one wh o believes that no advice may be given to leaders; nay rather I j udge him to be not a sage, but haughty, who conducts everything a ccording to his own opinion alone. What therefore is my conclusio n? Generals should receive advice, in the first place from the ex perts who are both specially skilled in military matters and have learned from experience; secondly, from those who are on the sce ne of action, who see the terrain, the enemy, the fitness of the occasion, who are sharers in the danger, as it were, aboard the s ame vessel. Thus, if there is anyone who is confident that he can advise me as to the best advantage of the state in this campaign which I am about to conduct, let him not refuse his services to the state, but come with me into Macedonia. I will furnish him wi th his sea-passage, with a horse, a tent, and even travel-funds. If anyone is reluctant to do this and prefers the leisure of the city to the hardships of campaigning, let him not steer the ship from on shore. The city itself provides enough subjects for conve rsation; let him confine his garrulity to these; and let him be a ware that I shall be satisfied with the advice originating in cam p.1 The Consul's cry for a free hand echoes that of generals thr oughout history-although the historian Livy records that, as a ma tter of fact, an unusually large number of senators decided to ac company him on campaign. Still, the notion that generals once giv en a mission should have near total discretion in its execution i s a powerful one. Popular interpretations of the Vietnam and Gul f wars, the one supposedly a conflict characterized by civilian i nterference in the details of warmaking, the other a model of ben ign operational and tactical neglect by an enlightened civilian l eadership, seem to confirm the value of a bright line drawn betwe en the duties of soldiers and civilians. Thus the chief of staff to General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of US forces in Southwes t Asia: Schwarzkopf was never second-guessed by civilians, and th at's the way it ought to work.2 Or more directly, then-President George Bush's declaration when he received the Association of the US Army's George Catlett Marshall Medal: I vowed that I would ne ver send an American soldier into combat with one hand tied behin d that soldier's back. We did the politics and you superbly did t he fighting.3 Small wonder, then, that the editor of the US Army War College's journal wrote to his military colleagues: There wi ll be instances where civilian officials with Napoleon complexes and micromanaging mentalities are prompted to seize the reins of operational control. And having taken control, there will be time s when they then begin to fumble toward disaster. When this threa tens to happen, the nation's top soldier . . . must summon the co urage to rise and say to his civilian masters, You can't do that! and then stride to the focal point of decision and tell them how it must be done.4 Such a view of the roles of civilian and sold ier reflects popular understandings as well. The 1996 movie Indep endence Day, for example, features only one notable villain (asid e, that is, from the aliens who are attempting to devastate and c onquer the Earth)-an overweening secretary of defense who attempt s to direct the American military's counterattack against the inv aders from outer space. Only after the interfering and deceitful civilian is out of the way can the president, a former Air Force combat pilot who gets back into uniform to lead the climactic aer ial battle, and his military assistants (with the aid of one civi lian scientist in a purely technical role) get on with the job of defeating the foe. To this comfortable consensus of capital, cam p, and, Anchor, 2003, 3, Oxford University Press. Good. 6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches. Hardcover. 2003. 256 pages. Ex-library<br>The Fall of France in 1940 is one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth century. If the German invasion of France had failed, it is arguable that the war might have end ed right there. But the French suffered instead a dramatic and hu miliating defeat, a loss that ultimately drew the whole world int o war. This exciting new book by Julian Jackson, a leading histo rian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greate st bastions of the Western Allies. Using eyewitness accounts, mem oirs, and diaries to bring the story to life, Jackson not only re creates the intense atmosphere of the six weeks in May and June l eading up to the establishment of the Vichy regime, but he also u nravels the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question--was the fall of France inevitable. Jackson's vivid narrative explores the errors of France's military leaders, her inability to create stronger alliances, the political infigh ting, the lack of morale, even the decadence of the inter-war yea rs. He debunks the vast superiority of the German army, revealing that the more experienced French troops did well in battle again st the Germans. Perhaps more than anything else, the cause of the defeat was the failure of the French to pinpoint where the main thrust of the German army would come, a failure that led them to put their best soldiers up against a feint, while their worst tro ops faced the heart of the German war machine. An engaging and au thoritative narrative, The Fall of France illuminates six weeks t hat changed the course of twentieth-century history. Editorial R eviews From Publishers Weekly In his thorough monograph, Univers ity of Swansea historian Jackson (The Dark Years) begins with pre -war developments-French military innovations and battle strategy ; Germany's plan to invade Belgium and France-before recounting t he German breakthrough and defeat of British and French forces in May 1940. The second chapter opens with General Weygand taking c ommand of the French army later that month, then provides backgro und on France's position in Europe before the war, particularly i ts relations with Great Britain: the failure of attempted British -French-Soviet alliance in early 1939, and the so-called Phony Wa r on the western front September 1939-April 1940. He tracks Frenc h attempts to halt the German onslaught and the evacuation of All ied troops from Dunkirk, leading to the June 1940 surrender, then cuts back to analyze French internal politics during the 1930s a nd its effect on French foreign policy. Another chapter gets devo ted to the French people circa 1940, including pacifist society f ollowing World War I; soldiers' reactions to the German invasion and recollections of the mass exodus of WWI refugees from the adv ancing Germans are also covered. The final chapters provide a his toriography of the campaign itself and the effects of the defeat on France, focusing on the collaborationist Vichy government that followed the defeat, the rise of De Gaulle's movement, and a tre atment of how the defeat is viewed today. Designed for the academ ic rather than the casual reader, this presentation is careful an d measured, and seems likely to find its way onto college history syllabi. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc. Review Superb, highly accessible revisionist study of Germany's swift defeat of France in 1940 and its wide-ranging implications, then and now.... Should spark discussion among WWII historians and gre at interest among military history buffs.--Kirkus Reviews France 's sudden and shocking defeat in May of 1940 was one of the great calamities in the history of Western democracy.... Jackson asses ses the social and political, and also the diplomatic, intelligen ce, and military, context of the catastrophe.... An admirably acc essible analytical history of a complex and fraught event.--Atlan tic Monthly Jackson's book tells in gripping detail the military , human and political story of a few crucial weeks whose ramifica tions for European relations for decades afterwards were enormous .... More than a military history, this sharply written account i s also an elegy for a fading culture in which we all have a stake .--Financial Times A brilliant and authoritative book, compellin gly written and persuasive in its explanation of one of the most puzzling events in 20th-century history. Impossible to put down.' Richard Evans, Cambridge University'A fine, powerful and very re adable book. Jackson brings a freshness and sharpness to the disc ussion, with the reader being drawn straight into the action and atmosphere.--Robert Gildea, Oxford University About the Author Julian Jackson is Professor of French History at the University o f Swansea and the author of several books on twentieth-century Fr ance, including France: The Dark Years 1940-1944, which was a fin alist for a Los Angeles Times Book Award. ., Oxford University Press, 2003, 2.5<

2003, ISBN: 9780192803009

Oxford University Press. Good. 6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches. Hardcover. 2003. 256 pages. Ex-library<br>The Fall of France in 1940 is one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth century. If… Mehr…

Oxford University Press. Good. 6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches. Hardcover. 2003. 256 pages. Ex-library<br>The Fall of France in 1940 is one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth century. If the German invasion of France had failed, it is arguable that the war might have end ed right there. But the French suffered instead a dramatic and hu miliating defeat, a loss that ultimately drew the whole world int o war. This exciting new book by Julian Jackson, a leading histo rian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greate st bastions of the Western Allies. Using eyewitness accounts, mem oirs, and diaries to bring the story to life, Jackson not only re creates the intense atmosphere of the six weeks in May and June l eading up to the establishment of the Vichy regime, but he also u nravels the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question--was the fall of France inevitable. Jackson's vivid narrative explores the errors of France's military leaders, her inability to create stronger alliances, the political infigh ting, the lack of morale, even the decadence of the inter-war yea rs. He debunks the vast superiority of the German army, revealing that the more experienced French troops did well in battle again st the Germans. Perhaps more than anything else, the cause of the defeat was the failure of the French to pinpoint where the main thrust of the German army would come, a failure that led them to put their best soldiers up against a feint, while their worst tro ops faced the heart of the German war machine. An engaging and au thoritative narrative, The Fall of France illuminates six weeks t hat changed the course of twentieth-century history. Editorial R eviews From Publishers Weekly In his thorough monograph, Univers ity of Swansea historian Jackson (The Dark Years) begins with pre -war developments-French military innovations and battle strategy ; Germany's plan to invade Belgium and France-before recounting t he German breakthrough and defeat of British and French forces in May 1940. The second chapter opens with General Weygand taking c ommand of the French army later that month, then provides backgro und on France's position in Europe before the war, particularly i ts relations with Great Britain: the failure of attempted British -French-Soviet alliance in early 1939, and the so-called Phony Wa r on the western front September 1939-April 1940. He tracks Frenc h attempts to halt the German onslaught and the evacuation of All ied troops from Dunkirk, leading to the June 1940 surrender, then cuts back to analyze French internal politics during the 1930s a nd its effect on French foreign policy. Another chapter gets devo ted to the French people circa 1940, including pacifist society f ollowing World War I; soldiers' reactions to the German invasion and recollections of the mass exodus of WWI refugees from the adv ancing Germans are also covered. The final chapters provide a his toriography of the campaign itself and the effects of the defeat on France, focusing on the collaborationist Vichy government that followed the defeat, the rise of De Gaulle's movement, and a tre atment of how the defeat is viewed today. Designed for the academ ic rather than the casual reader, this presentation is careful an d measured, and seems likely to find its way onto college history syllabi. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc. Review Superb, highly accessible revisionist study of Germany's swift defeat of France in 1940 and its wide-ranging implications, then and now.... Should spark discussion among WWII historians and gre at interest among military history buffs.--Kirkus Reviews France 's sudden and shocking defeat in May of 1940 was one of the great calamities in the history of Western democracy.... Jackson asses ses the social and political, and also the diplomatic, intelligen ce, and military, context of the catastrophe.... An admirably acc essible analytical history of a complex and fraught event.--Atlan tic Monthly Jackson's book tells in gripping detail the military , human and political story of a few crucial weeks whose ramifica tions for European relations for decades afterwards were enormous .... More than a military history, this sharply written account i s also an elegy for a fading culture in which we all have a stake .--Financial Times A brilliant and authoritative book, compellin gly written and persuasive in its explanation of one of the most puzzling events in 20th-century history. Impossible to put down.' Richard Evans, Cambridge University'A fine, powerful and very re adable book. Jackson brings a freshness and sharpness to the disc ussion, with the reader being drawn straight into the action and atmosphere.--Robert Gildea, Oxford University About the Author Julian Jackson is Professor of French History at the University o f Swansea and the author of several books on twentieth-century Fr ance, including France: The Dark Years 1940-1944, which was a fin alist for a Los Angeles Times Book Award. ., Oxford University Press, 2003, 2.5<

ISBN: 9780192803009

Oxford University Press. Hardcover. POOR. Noticeably used book. Heavy wear to cover. Pages contain marginal notes, underlining, and or highlighting. Possible ex library copy, with all t… Mehr…

Oxford University Press. Hardcover. POOR. Noticeably used book. Heavy wear to cover. Pages contain marginal notes, underlining, and or highlighting. Possible ex library copy, with all the markings/stickers of that library. Accessories such as CD, codes, toys, and dust jackets may not be included., Oxford University Press, 1<